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Securitizing HIV/AIDS: a game changer in
state-societal relations in China?
Catherine Yuk-ping Lo
Abstract
Background: China has experienced unprecedented economic growth since the 1980s. Despite this impressive
economic development, this growth exists side by side with the human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune
deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) crises and the persisting deficiencies
in public health provision in China. Acknowledging the prevailing health problems, the Chinese government has
encouraged the development of health non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to respond to the health
challenges and address the gaps in public health provision of the government. HIV/AIDS-focused NGOs have
been perceived as the most outstanding civil society group developed in China. Considering the low priority
of health policies since the economic reform, the limitation of the “third sector” activity permitted in authoritarian
China, together with the political sensitivity of the HIV/AIDS problem in the country, this article aims to explain the
proliferation of HIV/AIDS-focused NGOs in China with the usage of the securitization framework in the field of
international relations (IR).
Methods: The research that underpins this article is based on a desk-based literature review as well as in-depth field
interviews with individuals working in HIV/AIDS-focused NGOs in China. Face-to-face interviews for this research were
conducted between January and May in 2011, and between December 2016 and January 2017, in China. Discourse
analysis was in particular employed in the study of the security-threat framing process (securitization) of HIV/
AIDS in China.
Results: This article argues that the proliferation of HIV/AIDS-related NGOs in China is largely attributed to
the normative and technical effects of HIV/AIDS securitization ushered in by the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) and supported by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (hereinafter Global
Fund) observed in China. Despite depicting a positive scenario, the development of HIV/AIDS-focused NGOs
in China generated by the international securitization efforts is largely limited. An internal and external factor
was identified to verify the argument, namely (1) the reduction of international financial commitments, as
well as (2) the fragmentation of HIV/AIDS-focused NGO community in China.
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Conclusions: This article shows that international securitization weakened with the rise of Chinese
commitment on HIV/AIDS interventions. In other words, HIV/AIDS-related responses delivered by the national
government are no longer checked by the global mechanism of HIV/AIDS; thus it is unclear whether these
NGOs would remain of interest as partners for the government. The fragmentation of the HIV/AIDS
community would further hinder the development, preventing from NGOs with the same interest forming
alliances to call for changes in current political environment. Such restriction on the concerted efforts of HIV/
AIDS-related NGOs in China would make achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to foster
stronger partnerships between the government and civil society difficult, which in turn hindering the
realization of ending HIV/AIDS in the world by 2030.
Keywords: HIV/AIDS securitization, Health NGOs in China, Global health initiatives (GHIs), Global Fund, United
Nations Security Council (UNSC), Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
Background
China has experienced remarkable economic growth
since the initiation of the economic reform in the 1980s.
The average GDP growth in China was 9.6% annually
during the first two decades of the economic reform [1].
The rising nation became the world’s leading manufac-
turing power in 2011, and it surpassed the United States
as the world’s largest trading country [2]. Jakovljievic fur-
ther predicted that the economic growth in China would
continue at least up to the middle of the 21st century
[3]. Despite such impressive economic performance, the
provision of public health and the control of infectious
diseases have been marginalized. Between the late 1980s
and 2003, the Chinese national government public
health spending as a proportion of total health spending
plunged from 30% to just over 15% [4], despite the fact
that China has outperformed other developing countries,
such as other BRICS members, regarding the public
health spending in nominal terms [5]. As argued by Yip
and Mahal, Chinese political leaders in the above-
mentioned period of time simply perceived health as “a
consumption activity rather than a productive good and
therefore was given lower priority in government
funding” [4]. In this regard, the Chinese authorities de-
liberately curtailed the level of public health expendi-
tures so that economic development could be pursued
and the legitimacy of the one-party authoritarian regime
bolstered.
Acknowledging the economic success in the past de-
cades, HIV/AIDS nevertheless emerged as one of the
“negative externalities” of public health threats brought
about by the 1980s economic reform. HIV/AIDS was
first discovered in China during the mid-1980s, the same
period when the economic reform was just beginning.
The epidemic was exacerbated in China in the 1990s
mainly because of government-supported blood plasma
selling, which did not follow adequate sterilization pro-
cedures. This lack of regulation resulted in the
emergence of so-called AIDS villages (Aizibing cun) in
Henan and its outlying provinces, where a large percent-
age of rural residents were infected with HIV/AIDS [6].
Having little benefit from the economic reform in ways
that coastal provinces did during the 1980s, many resi-
dents in the central plains had little choice but to engage
in the blood-plasma industry to improve their standard
of living. Since 2000, HIV/AIDS has become a politically
sensitive issue in China because of the international con-
demnation of the Henan blood scandal. According to
the latest figures released by The Joint United Nations
Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), 660,000 people were
estimated to have HIV/AIDS in China in 2016 [7]. The
country has the second largest HIV/AIDS population in
Asia after India.
The Chinese government started addressing the HIV/
AIDS problem after years of denial and underestimation
of the HIV/AIDS prevalence in the country, especially
among the most-at-risk populations (MARPs) including
injecting drug users (IDUs), female sex workers (FSW),
and men who have sex with men (MSM) [8]. However,
national HIV/AIDS policies in the early years were very
much driven in a top-down manner with government in-
stitutions (i.e. mainly the Chinese Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention [China CDC hereinafter]) play-
ing a leading role and with limited engagement of the
“third sector” [9, 10]. Given the association of the dis-
ease with behaviors that are legally or socially unaccept-
able in the country (i.e., commercial sex work, injecting
drug use, and men having sex with men), HIV/AIDS
high-risk individuals refrain from using the related ser-
vices provided by the government agencies because they
wish to avoid being seized or humiliated by public secur-
ity officials or by thugs hired by local officials [11]. In
this regard, Gåsemyr claimed that the emergence of
HIV/AIDS-focused non-governmental organizations
(NGOs)1 in China during the early 1990s could fill the
capacity gap of the government by implementing
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national HIV/AIDS policies and providing the related
services for those MARPs that are hard to reach by the
authorities [12]. Considering the low priority of health
policies since the economic reform, the limitation of the
“third sector” activity permitted in authoritarian China,
together with the political sensitivity of the HIV/AIDS
problem in the country, it is believed that the involve-
ment of HIV/AIDS-related NGOs in China would be
largely limited. This is however not the case. Over the
last 15 years there has been a dramatic increase in the
number of HIV/AIDS-focused NGOs operating in
China. While Gåsemyr argued that the growth of HIV/
AIDS-related NGOs is mainly attributed to the devastat-
ing health crisis of SARS in China and the new Chinese
leadership in 2003 [12], the previous work cannot ex-
plain why a high degree of political recognition was ob-
served in solely HIV/AIDS NGOs, instead of other
health NGOs, such as TB or cancer NGOs in China.
This article aims to fill this research gap with regard to
the proliferation of HIV/AIDS-focused NGOs in China
with the use of the securitization framework in the field
of IR.
Methods
Research methodology: Discourse analysis
The research that underpins this article is based on
desk-based literature review as well as in-depth field in-
terviews with individuals working in HIV/AIDS-focused
NGOs in China. Discourse analysis was in particular
employed to study the securitization of HIV/AIDS in
China. Potter argued that “discourse analysis has an ana-
lytic commitment to studying discourses as texts and
talks in social practice…the focus is…on language as…
the medium for interaction…One theme that is particu-
larly emphasized here is the rhetorical or augmentative
organization of talk and texts” [13]. Silverman pointed
out that the intellectual ancestor of discourse analysis is
John Langshaw Austin, the original inventor of the idea
of speech acts that later became the core element in
securitization theory [14]. Concerning discourse analysis
and speech acts share the Austinian concern with the
rhetorical structure of talk and texts, the founding
scholars of securitization theory, Buzan, Wæver and
Wilde explicitly stated, “the obvious method [to study
securitization] is discourse analysis, since we are inter-
ested in when and how something is established by
whom as a security threat” [15]. The authors also noted
that the technique of employing discourse analysis to
securitization studies is to “read[ing], looking for argu-
ments that take the rhetorical and logical form defined
here as security” [15]. The meaning of security is
constructed when the political leaders (securitizing
actors) frames an issue as an existential threat to the
referent objects,2 claiming the issue as having an
absolute priority on the government agenda, thereby
invoking a right to handle such an issue with extraor-
dinary/emergency measures to ensure the survival of
the referent objects [16].
In this research, public speeches (in written form) re-
lated to HIV/AIDS problems, which were delivered by
the top-level political leaders, were examined. A specific
rhetorical structure had to be located in their discourses,
consisting of either one or all of the following elements:
(1) the existence of an existential threat; and/or (2) the
perceived threat is challenging the survival of the states
or people in the states (referent objects), and/or which it
requires to (3) be urgently dealt with by new political
measures of the respective country. An array of docu-
ments ranging from official documents, reports, news-
paper articles was initially identified via the search
engines of Google Scholar and ProQuest with the key-
words of “HIV/AIDS”, “security threat”, and “China”.
Nine key articles were consequently singled out to iden-
tify the textual discourses related to HIV/AIDS threat/
security nexus in China, published or released between
1987 and 2011 (Table 1).
Primary data collection: Semi-structured interviews in
China
A total of 47 semi-structured interviews were conducted
along with the discourse analysis. Apart from the back-
ground information of the respective NGOs, the inter-
view questions used in this study are categorized into
three main dimensions: (1) the priority of HIV/AIDS on
the government agenda; (2) the perceptions on the chan-
ging international and national financial commitment on
HIV/AIDS interventions; and (3) civil society involve-
ment and coordination in national HIV/AIDS policies.
The first dimension aimed to ensure that the NGOs re-
spondents were knowledgeable about the changing
Table 1 Official documents, reports, newspaper articles for
discourse analysis
Anderson D. Peking Daily Cautions against Western Threats of AIDS,
Drugs. The Associated Press. (1987).
Certain Regulations on the Monitoring and Control of AIDS (1988)
China Has No Sources, Studies Show. Xinhua (1988)
Prevention and Treatment of Infectious Diseases (1989)
Speech by Executive Vice Minister of Health, Mr. Gao Qiang, at the
HIV/AIDS High-Level Meeting of the UN General Assembly. Permanent
Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN (2003)
State Council Notice on Strengthening HIV/AIDS Prevention and
Control (2004)
Law on Communicable Disease Prevention and Control (2004)
Regulation on AIDS Prevention and Control (2006)
State Council Notice on Further Strengthening HIV/AIDS Prevention
and Control (2010)
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national government perceptions and policy priority to-
wards HIV/AIDS in China, therefore, the researcher
could rule out those comments given by unknowledge-
able respondents so as to enhance the internal validity of
the data collected. The second dimension was included
to study their perceptions on the level of HIV/AIDS
funding and effect (if any) on the service provision. The
third dimension aimed to discover the actual level of in-
volvement of NGOs in national HIV/AIDS interventions
as well as the level of coordination and cooperation be-
tween different NGOs working on HIV/AIDS.
Two types of non-probability sampling—purposive
sampling, including “theoretical sampling” and snowball
sampling—were employed in the selection process of
key informants. For purposive sampling method, sam-
ples were selected based on the “logic” or “common-
sense” of the researcher in terms of the target
population, its elements, and the purpose of the study.
In this study, the target population consisted of the indi-
viduals working in HIV/AIDS-related NGOs at global,
national, and grassroots levels. In the course of the data
collection, “theoretical sampling” was also applied to
understand the subjects from a theoretical perspective.
Hence, academic scholars who have conducted research
on HIV/AIDS policies in China were also included in
the interviewee list. Interviewees were also recruited via
snowball sampling. The researcher collected data on the
few members, and each respondent was asked to suggest
people whom the respondent believed to be the most in-
fluential for interviewing.
Interviews for this research were undertaken between
January and May in 2011, and between December 2016
and January 2017 with leaders or senior officers working
on HIV/AIDS in China, including 15 international
NGOs, nine self-help groups, four GONGOs, five advo-
cacy groups, two national NGO, one independent con-
sultant, two academia, and two networks (See Table 2).
Twenty-six respondents were pinpointed based on the
list of the 2009/2010 China HIV/AIDS NGO Directory
(Zhongguo aizhibing shehuizuzhi minglu) published by a
quasi-NGO, China HIV/AIDS Information Network, op-
erated in Beijing. The rest of the respondents in this re-
search were recruited via the technique of snowball
sampling and theoretical sampling. There were some ex-
ceptional cases regarding the inclusion of some inter-
viewees in this study. Amongst the NGO respondents,
three of them were based in Hong Kong. These individ-
uals were interviewed because of their direct participa-
tion in the HIV/AIDS interventions in the Chinese cities
in the past years, as well as their close relationship with
the government officials and other HIV/AIDS-related
NGO members in Mainland China. In addition, four
government officials working in the National Health and
Family Planning Commission (NHFPC) were inter-
viewed, including the National Center for AIDS/STD
Control and Prevention (NCAIDS), China CDC in
Beijing, Shanghai, and also Zhejiang. The inclusion of
the government officials was made to have a better un-
derstanding of the stance of the national government to-
wards HIV/AIDS issues. Ethical approval for this
research (including subject participation) was provided
by the City University of Hong Kong Human Subjects
Ethics Committee, under the project Asian Diseases in
International Affairs, Ref: 2A-54-201,303 (H00112).
Results
Literature review: State-societal relations and HIV/AIDS-
related NGOs in contemporary China
Civil society (Minjian shehui)3 was not considered as
part of the political system in the pre-modern era; the
emergence of a relatively independent civil society is a
product of modern China. The changing socio-economic
relations brought about by “Open Door Policy” resulted
in the recognition and growth of civil society for the first
time in the Chinese history [17]. Despite the early emer-
gence of civil society, the 1999 Falung Gong incident
showcased the destructive power of civil society in the
eyes of the Chinese government, worrying a robust,
well-organized, and out-of-control civil society could
overthrow and replace the CCP ruling position. Mean-
while, the authorities realized the supplementary role
NGOs could perform in policy implementation. The
Chinese government has thus resolved such dilemma by
adopting a “state-led” approach to manage civil society
in China. Based on Frolic’s concept of “state-led civil so-
ciety”, civil society is created by and belong to the state,
thus the independence and autonomy of civil society are
at all time bounded by the state [18]. The state has the
role of legitimating social organizations, demanding a
disciplined partnership. Accordingly, antagonism inher-
ited in the Western concept of civil society is not
allowed to exist in the state-society relations in Chinese
Table 2 Categorization of respondents in China
Number of
interviewees
Types of
organizations
Locations
15 INGO Beijing, Kunming
9 Self-help group Beijing, Shanghai, Kunming
4 GONGO Beijing
5 Advocacy group Beijing, Shanghai, Kunming
2 National NGO Beijing
1 Independent consultant Kunming
2 University researcher Beijing, Hong Kong
2 Network Beijing, Kunming
3 Hong Kong-based NGO Hong Kong
4 CCDC/NHFPC Beijing, Shanghai, Zhejiang
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authoritarian regime; any alternative force to the state is
considered as an attempt to curtail or overturn its polit-
ical legitimacy and power.
Accordingly, the state apparatus has managed the num-
bers and restricted the growth of both international and
grassroots NGOs via various legislative means, thereby
allowing NGOs to operate openly but at the same time
keep the organization growth in check [19, 20]. Inter-
national non-governmental organizations (INGOs) in
China are regulated by the 1989 Interim Procedures on
Foreign Chambers of Commerce (Waiguo shanghui guanli
zhanhang guiding) [21]. This law stipulates that INGOs
can only set up one branch office in China, restricting the
geographic scope (and thus political or social influences)
of INGOs operating in the country. In regulating the rapid
influx of foreign endowment in China in the early 2000s,
especially in the realm of HIV/AIDS interventions, the
State Council promulgated the Regulations on the Man-
agement of Foundations (Jijin guanli tiaoli) in 2004.4
Despite these regulations, the Chinese authorities had
relatively given more autonomy to INGOs than grassroots
NGOs operating in its territory, since the government
could access international expertise and tap foreign money
to tackle with the emerging social problems in China [22].
Such degree of autonomy is nevertheless problematic after
the promulgation of Foreign NGOs Management Law
(Jingwai fei zhengfu zuzhi guanli fa) in April 2016. The
2016 law stipulates that INGOs operating in China must
register with public security officials, and must not engage
in political or religious activities that damage “China’s
national interests” or “ethnic unity”. International commu-
nity and western governments perceived the new law as a
reinforcement of restriction of the numbers and scopes of
foreign entities operating in the authoritarian regime.
Grassroots NGOs are regulated by the Regulation on
Registration and Administration of Social Organizations
(Shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli). According to the
1998 regulation (amended in February 2016), a NGO
must possess a minimum asset of 100,000 yuan and have
a “professional management unit” (Zhuguan danwei)
that acts as a supervisory body to the organization in
order to register under the Ministry of Civic Affairs
(MOCA).5 Fulfilling these two requirements is very for-
midable for grassroots NGOs. The financial situation is
problematic in many grassroots NGOs because of the
limited source of funding. On the one hand, most grass-
roots NGOs receive limited financial support from the
government, as they usually do not have political ties
with the government. Grassroots NGOs also seldom re-
ceive donations from local communities because (1)
newly developed NGOs do not have good track records
that enable them to win the trust of the locals, and (2)
donors cannot receive tax breaks for their donation to
unregistered NGOs [23, 24]. In addition, most
government departments simply reject their applications
due to fear of consequences of taking responsibilities for
grassroots NGOs. Many grassroots NGOs are hence
often unregistered or registered as business entities with
the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MOIC) [25].6
In addition to the abovementioned restrictions, the
Regulation also bans “similar organizations” coexisting
at the various administrative levels [21], facilitating the
management and even control the legal status of grass-
roots NGOs in China.7 Having official registration, to
certain extent, is sine qua non to the survival of organi-
zations as the legal status entitles NGOs as official rec-
ognized entities to receive legal and financial supports
from the government; unregistered NGOs are officially
perceived as illegal that would be subjected to prosecu-
tion and coercion by the state apparatus.8
Considering a restrictive engagement of grassroots
NGOs in China, instead of grassroots NGOs, early HIV/
AIDS-related responses at societal level were largely
conducted by GONGOs [26],9 such as The Chinese As-
sociation of STD and AIDS Prevention as well as the
Chinese Preventive Medicine Association. A few NGOs
working on HIV/AIDS emerged with the upsurge in the
number of infections in the country during the 1990s.
Established in 1994 by Dr. Wan Yanhai, the Beijing-
based AIDS Action (Aizhixing) was one of the earliest
and prominent HIV/AIDS-related NGOs operating in
China.
A dramatic increase in the number of HIV/AIDS-fo-
cused NGOs has nevertheless been observed in China
since 2003. According to the figures released in the
2009/2010 China HIV/AIDS NGO Directory (Zhongguo
aizhibing shehuizuzhi minglu), the number of registered
and unregistered NGOs working on HIV/AIDS issues in
China increased from 52 before 2003 to over 600 in
2010 [27]. Considering the low priority of health policies
since the economic reform, the limitation of the “third
sector” activity permitted in authoritarian China, to-
gether with the political sensitivity of the HIV/AIDS
problem in the country, it is intriguing to uncover the
reasons for the growth of HIV/AIDS-focused NGOs in
China since 2003.
Gåsemyr argued that the growth of HIV/AIDS-related
NGOs is mainly attributed to the devastating health
crisis of SARS in China and the new Chinese leadership
in 2003 [12]. Having said that the Chinese government
realized the impacts health problems or infectious
diseases could have on its economic and social develop-
ment, the previous work cannot explain why a high de-
gree of political recognition was observed solely in HIV/
AIDS NGOs, instead of other health NGOs, such as TB
or cancer NGOs in China. Considering the regime type
of the government, allowing the growth of local NGOs
would in turn potentially attenuate the supremacy of the
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Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in ruling the country
or erode the autonomy of the state, why the Chinese
government tolerated, allowed, or even encouraged the
growth of NGOs in fixing HIV/AIDS problems, espe-
cially the epidemic has been viewed as a politically sensi-
tive issue in China? How can one account for and
understand the phenomenon?
Answering the key question with an IR perspective,
this article argues that the rapid development of HIV/
AIDS-related NGOs in China is attributed to the effects
of HIV/AIDS securitization at the international level
since 2000. Considering one of the most influential the-
ories developed in the field of IR, securitization
describes the process of defining an issue as a security
threat (speech acts) and the corresponding political
responses to block the adverse development of the per-
ceived threat (emergency measures). This article particu-
larly pinpoints the UNSC and the Global Fund, which
provide normative and technical supports, to study this
endeavor. Normative influences in this article refer to
the effects of security-threat discourses, primarily Reso-
lution 1308 of the UNSC, on the national government’s
perception on HIV/AIDS problems, whereas technical
influences refer to the effects of global emergency mea-
sures, in particular the Global Fund, on the funding and
management of HIV/AIDS-related policies at the state
level [28]. This article aims to demonstrate the ways in
which international HIV/AIDS securitization has served
as a game changer in altering state-society relations in
China. Drawing on literature reviews and fieldwork ma-
terials, this article further argues that the proliferation of
HIV/AIDS-focused NGOs in China generated by the
international securitization efforts is nevertheless largely
limited owing to the reduction of international financial
commitments. The fragmentation of HIV/AIDS-focused
NGO community is another factor hindering the devel-
opment of a full-fledged third sector in the country.
Literature review: HIV/AIDS securitization in the
international level
Securitization in the IR discipline is a model outlining
the process of framing an issue as a security threat and
the corresponding political reactions to block the ad-
verse development of the perceived threat. Employing
the theory, one is required to look for three criteria to
determine whether an issue is a threat to the country
and its people, including 1) discourses uttered by top-
level political leader (securitizing actor) declaring a
particular referent objects as an existential threat to se-
curity; 2) acceptance by the targeted audience convinced
of its potential to be an existential threat (audience ac-
ceptance); and also 3) redirections of existing financial
resources, new policies, or practices (emergency mea-
sures) are implemented to address the issue following
the security-threat claim [15]. In other words, the reso-
lution of the “existential threat” posed by “X” takes pre-
cedence over other problems [29].
Numbers of security studies scholars believed that
HIV/AIDS is the first infectious disease being securitized
by the international institutions and national govern-
ments as the abovementioned criteria were all fulfilled in
the case of HIV/AIDS [9, 30–32]. Speech acts concern-
ing HIV/AIDS as a security threat were first identified in
a UNSC meeting in January 2000.10 In July of the same
year, the UNSC passed Resolution 1308, acknowledging
the urgent need to address HIV/AIDS, which threatens
the stability and security if left unchecked [33]. It is per-
ceived that the particular security framing of HIV/AIDS
gained acceptance by the national governments (audi-
ence of the HIV/AIDS security-threat claim) since 189
countries unanimously adopted and signed the Declar-
ation of Commitment on HIV/AIDS in 2001. The ur-
gency of addressing HIV/AIDS problems was reinforced
in the special United Nations General Assembly Special
Session (UNGASS) devoted to HIV/AIDS that has taken
place every 5 years since 2001 [34–37]. The abovemen-
tioned events are significant because they represented
the first time that the UNSC General Assembly devoted
an entire session to a single disease, and the first time
that the international political authorities framed HIV/
AIDS as a global health threat to national and inter-
national security instead of solely as a developmental or
public health problem [38].11
The 2000 rhetorical act was backed by operational
emergency responses in terms of the augmentation of
the global HIV/AIDS spending since 2000. The amount
was exponentially surged from about US$900 million in
1999 to US$16 billion by 2009; and to an estimated
US$19 billion in 2013 [39]. Several HIV/AIDS-related
funding agencies and health programs formulated after
2000, also referred to Global Health Initiatives (GHIs),
brought in additional monetary resources for HIV/AIDS
[40].12 Perceiving as the most prominent GHIs, the Glo-
bal Fund pledges to accelerate the end of the three epi-
demics, [HIV/]AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria by
providing financial support (US$4 billion annually) for
low-income countries to respond to the three diseases
[41]. Undoubtedly, the introduction of the abovemen-
tioned GHIs has brought about unprecedented levels of
funding for diseases, in particular HIV/AIDS, in coun-
tries that have insufficient resources, whether because of
poor socio-economic development or lack of political
will, to orchestrate appropriate responses to the intract-
able disease.
Acknowledging international securitizing efforts on
HIV/AIDS, this article illustrates the normative effects
of Resolution 1308 of the UNSC and the technical influ-
ences of the Global Fund on national-level HIV/AIDS
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responses. China is selected as a case study to investigate
this endeavor. China’s response to the HIV/AIDS prob-
lem changed from an ignorance of “global evidence-
based policy recommendations and international advice”
into “one of our success stories [in global HIV/AIDS
fight] during this past 15 years,” as claimed by Michel
Sidibe, executive director of the UNAIDS [42, 43]. The
subsequent sections demonstrate the ways in which the
securitization effort in the international level acted as a
game changer for HIV/AIDS-focused NGOs in partici-
pating in national HIV/AIDS undertakings in China.
Chinese case study
Discourse analysis: Normative influences and the role of the
UNSC
In China, many of the first cases of HIV/AIDS since
1985 occurred among foreigners and homosexuals.
Therefore, the official discourses at that time promoted
the idea that HIV/AIDS only affected non-local Chinese
people and foreigners, asserting “drug taking, alcohol-
ism, robbery, homicide, suicide, divorce, prostitution,
homosexuality, syphilis, AIDS…These kinds of Western
social ills come from their ideology”, and also claiming
“China had no sources of HIV/AIDS” [44, 45]. The rhet-
orical acknowledgement of HIV/AIDS as a health secur-
ity threat to the Chinese population was largely absent
during the early period of time. Ramiah also pinpointed
that the Chinese leadership was extremely reluctant to
acknowledge HIV/AIDS as a problem and securitize
HIV/AIDS in China prior to the 2000s [46].
One probable reason for the resistance to HIV/AIDS
securitization is economic: the period of early HIV/AIDS
outbreak coincided with the initial years of Open Door
Policy and economic reform (Gaige kaifang) of China to
the outside world. The thirst for economic growth and
performance preceded the urgency of disease manage-
ment: local authorities feared their respected jurisdic-
tions would lose external or foreign investment if the
full extent of the problem were known, or that they
would be punished by superiors for failing to prevent
the HIV/AIDS spread. The “cover-up” practice also oc-
curred during the early outbreak of SARS in China in
2003, for the infectious disease clearly posed a negative
impact on the Chinese flourishing trade and tourist
industry.
In light of the emerging HIV/AIDS epidemic in China,
the 2000 international HIV/AIDS securitization has been
well accepted by the Chinese government. China was
one of the 189 signatories to the 2001 Declaration of
Commitment on HIV/AIDS, showing its commitment to
follow suit the global consensus framework to response
to the HIV/AIDS threats. More importantly, the 2001
Declaration included a set of goals on which the national
governments agreed to achieve within a certain
timeframe (i.e. most targets should be fulfilled either by
2003 or by 2005).
In response to the designated targets, the security-
threat framing of HIV/AIDS has been fully adopted in
the official discourses of Chinese leaders and in official
documents since 2003. Previously viewing HIV/AIDS as
a “Western disease” or “non-Chinese disease”, Executive
Vice Minister of Health Gao Qiang stated in the HIV/
AIDS High-Level Meeting of the UN General Assembly
that “HIV/AIDS is a common enemy of the whole man-
kind as it seriously threatens public health and safety.
The Chinese government has attached great importance
to HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment and has treated
it as a strategic issue for social stability, economic devel-
opment, national prosperity and security, making it a
first priority of the government work” [emphasis added]
[47]. The Chinese President Hu Jintao once claimed in a
2003 public speech that “HIV/AIDS prevention, care
and treatment is a major issue pertinent to the quality
and prosperity of the Chinese nation”; whereas Premier
Wen likewise asserted that “dealing with HIV/AIDS as
an urgent and major issue is related to the fundamental
interests of the whole Chinese nation” [emphasis added]
[47]. The ideas in the speeches were restated in the offi-
cial document entitled State Council Notice on
Strengthening HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control
(Guowuyuan guanyu qieshi jiangqiang aizibing fangzhi
gongzuo de tongzi). This 2004 document explicitly dem-
onstrated the determination of the Chinese authorities
in grappling with the disease and stated that “HIV/AIDS
prevention and control is linked to economic develop-
ment, social stability, and national security and prosper-
ity. Long-term commitment to respond to HIV/AIDS is
hence necessary” [emphasis added] [48]. China’s HIV/
AIDS prevention and control policies were further
strengthened in the State Council Notice on Further
Strengthening HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control (Guo-
wuyuan guanyu jinyibu jiangqiang aizibing fangzhi gong-
zuo de tongzi) in late 2010, claiming that “the prevention
and control of HIV/AIDS is related to the people’s
physical health and social and economic development,
as well as to national security and the rise and fall of
the nation. The Party Central Committee and the
State Council have always attached great importance
to the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS” [em-
phasis added] [49]. Based on the discourse analysis of
the official documents and newspaper articles, it is ar-
gued that Chinese national leaders followed suit the
international move (i.e. UNSC Resolution 1308) to
securitize HIV/AIDS in the country, framing HIV/
AIDS as a threat with social, political, economic, and
security implications.
Such an alteration in perception toward the epidemic
brought about the political recognition of the HIV/
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AIDS-focused NGOs, which has also been highlighted
by multiple statements delivered by various top-level
government officials since 2003. In 2004, Vice Premier
Wu Yi stated, “We should mobilize all the partners in
society to participate in the fight against HIV/AIDS. We
need to improve our policies and strategies to build a
better environment for the society to participate in the
response, and try our best to facilitate the involvement
of all sectors” [49]. In 2011, Vice Minister of Health Yin
Li publicly proclaimed “civil societies play an indispens-
able role in effective HIV/AIDS interventions led by the
government” [50]. Premier Li Keqiang even promoted
tax break for NGOs specializing in HIV/AIDS preven-
tion, claiming the role of NGOs in HIV/AIDS preven-
tion “is an irreplaceable and unique force” [51]. To a
certain extent, these aforementioned statements demon-
strate the state’s recognition of NGOs’ works and its
willingness to engage with NGOs in national HIV/AIDS
interventions, although the political space of involve-
ment is by and large bounded by the state [52].
The previous section illustrates the change in the per-
ception of the Chinese government toward the HIV/
AIDS problems: from denial to the acceptance of the
threats that could be posed by the disease on the coun-
try and its people. Such threat recognition also brought
about the acknowledgement that the government alone
could not resolve the HIV/AIDS problems because of
the complicated nature of the epidemic; the involvement
of civil society groups was a globally recognized recom-
mendation leading to the successful containment of the
epidemic. Nevertheless, verbal recognition is not suffi-
cient to enhance the engagement and development of
HIV/AIDS-focused NGOs, especially in the preexisting
authoritarian government structure; the governance and
funding mechanism for HIV/AIDS responses requires
alternation in China. As illustrated in the following
section, this was the mechanism of the Global Fund that
enhanced the funding for HIV/AIDS-focused NGOs,
facilitating the involvement of civil society groups in
translating the rhetorical acts into emergency responses
of HIV/AIDS in China.
Key informant data: Technical influences and the role of
Global Fund
Among the international funding agencies emerging
after the HIV/AIDS securitization launched by the
UNSC, the Global Fund was the most renowned major
contributor to the HIV/AIDS interventions in China.
The Global Fund finally accepted the first proposal
submitted by the Chinese government on HIV/AIDS in-
terventions in late 2003, after the previous proposals be-
ing turned down twice in 2002 [52]. Between 2003 and
2012, the Chinese government has received over US$8
billion in grants from the Global Fund; approximately
US$324 million were disbursed to HIV/AIDS interven-
tion programs [41]. Further information regarding the
Global Fund on HIV/AIDS in China is illustrated in
Table 3.
Intervention of the Global Fund’s funding mechanism
was deemed to transform the primary HIV/AIDS gov-
ernance in China [53]. The Global Fund required the
governments to set up a country-level Country Coordin-
ation Mechanism (CCM) to construct the grant pro-
posals in line with the national HIV/AIDS-related
strategies, manage the use and distribution of grants,
and also oversee the implementation of successful appli-
cations. As per the requirement of the Global Fund,
CCM should consist of a broad representation from the
government, NGOs, multilateral and bilateral agencies,
and private sector [54]. In the existing government
structure in China, grassroots NGOs have limited chan-
nels to participate in policymaking and implementation
processes. Thus, the multi-sectoral structure of CCM
contributed to enhancing the government’s commitment
to involve NGOs in national HIV/AIDS prevention and
control measures [55]. Two among the 22 seats in Chin-
ese CCM were reserved for the representatives of HIV/
AIDS-related grassroots NGOs and people living with
HIV/AIDS are a case in point [56]. Considering the
existing government structure does not allow the full in-
volvement of NGOs in China, the CCM provided valu-
able opportunities for civil society groups to engage in
HIV/AIDS-related policymaking.
Table 3 Global Fund Grant Portfolio for HIV/AIDS in China [34]
Round Grant title Requested amount (in USD) Lifespan
3 China CARES (China Comprehensive Aids Response): A Community- Based HIV
Treatment, Care and Prevention Program in Central China
97,888,170 2004–2009
4 Reducing HIV transmission among and from vulnerable groups and alleviating its
impact in seven provinces in China
63,742,277 2005–2010
5 Preventing a new wave of HIV Infections in China 28,902,073 2006–2011
6 Mobilizing Civil Society to Scale Up HIV/AIDS Control Efforts in China 14,395,715 2007–2012
8 Reaching vulnerable migrants with HIV/AIDS prevention and care services in seven
provinces in China
61,413,199 2009–2014
RCCa China Global Fund AIDS Program 509,000,000 2010–2015
aRCC stands for Rolling Continuation Channel Program
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The involvement of NGOs in national HIV/AIDS pro-
grams was notably highlighted in Round 6 of the Global
Fund in China, since the theme of the grant proposal
submitted by the CCM was directly linked to the devel-
opment of civil society groups (Refer to Table 3). In the
course of the interview, a director of a Hong Kong-
based NGO commented on the profound influence of
the Round 6 on the NGO development: “Round 6 of the
Global Fund acts as a pushing force for the government
to involve more grassroots NGOs in HIV/AIDS inter-
ventions” (national NGO-1). In line with the respon-
dent’s opinion, Kaufman argued the Round 6 in
particular “was seen by many as a further mechanism to
institutionalize HIV/[AIDS] NGOs roles in China’s
[HIV]/AIDS response [42].”
In addition to the increase in participation, financial
support for NGOs working on HIV/AIDS-related pro-
grams surged through the Global Fund. As the Princi-
pal Recipient (PR) of the country, the Chinese
government (i.e., China CDC or the NHFPC) was re-
quired to disburse a designated portion of the grants to
HIV/AIDS-related NGOs (in the form of sub-recipients)
operating in the country [41]. Following the instruction,
20% of the total grant was allocated to support NGOs in
Round 3 and 4, whereas 50% of its grant was distributed
to NGOs in Round 5 of the Global Fund [56]. In line
with the theme of Round 6 entitled “Mobilizing Civil So-
ciety to Scale Up HIV/AIDS Control Efforts in China”
proposed by the Chinese CCM, the proportion granted
to HV/AIDS-related NGOs reached 100% [52]. Owing
to the constructive political atmosphere and promising
financial resources in the country, a burgeoning num-
ber of individual-organized HIV/AIDS-focused NGOs
was established in China; over 43% of the number of
grassroots NGOs increased in China between 2003 and
2004 [57].
The suspension of the Global Fund in 2011 demon-
strated that the funding mechanism to some extent held
the Chinese government accountable for the financial
supports of HIV/AIDS-focused NGOs. The Global Fund
once suspended its funding to Chinese HIV/AIDS pro-
grams in early 2011 because the Chinese CCM failed to
allocate 35% of the US$283 million HIV/AIDS grant to
grassroots NGOs as pledged; less than 11% was distrib-
uted to HIV/AIDS-focused NGOs [58]. A program offi-
cer of a NGO mentioned the failure of CCM to allocate
the right portion of the Global Fund grant to grassroots
NGOs: “Government officials and representatives from
GONGOs dominate the CCM. Only a few representa-
tives are from grassroots NGOs and civil society” (advo-
cacy group-1). The improper management and use of
the Global Fund was even admitted by a senior govern-
ment official in the Shanghai CDC in times of the
interview:
First, the Global Fund required at least 25 percent to
30 percent of the grant should be given to grassroots
NGOs. However, the government failed to achieve this
requirement. Second, the management fee in some
provinces was too high. Third, one of the elements in
the RCC program was related to budget aggregation
(i.e., monetary contribution by both the national
government and the Global Fund). However, the
Chinese government did not allocate enough money for
the aggregated budget (CCDC/NHFPC-1).
The determination of the Chinese government to re-
solve the suspension of the Global Fund was observed in
the course of fieldwork research. During a face-to-face
interview inside the office building of the Ministry of
Health (renamed National Health and Family Planning
Commission in 2013) in May 2011, the respondent told
the investigator “the representatives of the Chinese gov-
ernment and the Global Fund representatives are meet-
ing upstairs to negotiate for the resumption of the 2011
grants” (CCDC/NHFPC-2). The dispute was eventually
resolved; the Chinese government promised to allocate
at least 25% of the Global Fund grant to NGO work
[59]. In this regard, the Global Fund mechanism contrib-
uted to the political and financial supports of NGOs,
thereby resulting in the proliferation of HIV/AIDS-spe-
cific grassroots NGOs in China, and also the proactive
involvement of NGOs in national HIV/AIDS undertak-
ings. In other words, international securitization altered
the HIV/AIDS policy in China, allowing numerous
grassroots-level NGOs working on HIV/AIDS to grow
in a prevailing political system with “bounded auton-
omy”. An injecting drug use self-help group leader be-
lieved the upsurge in the involvement of civil society
also resulted in the improvement of state-societal rela-
tions, stating, “In the past, the relationship with the gov-
ernment was not good, but it becomes much better now.
The government sent officials to visit our center to learn
the management strategy of our organization” (self-help
group-1). Another NGO interviewee in Beijing also
claimed that “an increase in the acceptance of the gov-
ernment, especially the Ministry of Health, on grassroots
NGOs, [is observed in China]. The Ministry of Health
does open the opportunity for NGOs to cooperate with
the government” (advocacy group-2). Having said that
the improvement of state-societal relations, it is noted
that the Chinese state is not a monolithic actor, but a
conglomeration of departments and officials with com-
peting and sometimes conflicting agendas in the national
and sub-national levels [22]. A Beijing NGO leader pin-
pointed this phenomenon, stating, “The Ministry of
Health is fine to cooperate with those NGOs that can
help, regardless of whom. However, state security bureau
usually holds a relatively hostile view on the existence of
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grassroots NGOs since the bureau is concerned about
social stability” (advocacy group-2).
Considering HIV/AIDS as a health threat to the coun-
try and its people, the recognition and involvement by
the central government and the NHFPC and other
related government agencies is of particular vital to the
proliferation of HIV/AIDS-focused NGOs in a state-
dominated society in the current political regime.
Despite depicting a positive scenario, this article further
illustrates that the development of HIV/AIDS-focused
NGOs in China generated by the international
securitization efforts is largely limited. In other words,
the growth of the number of NGOs working on HIV/
AIDS in China would be ceased or even decreased in
long term, and also the political space for grassroots to
involve in HIV/AIDS policy making and implementation
would be further restricted. An internal and external fac-
tor was identified to verify the argument, namely (1) the
reduction of international financial commitment, as well
as (2) the fragmentation of HIV/AIDS-focused NGO
community in China.
Discussions
Obstacles of the development of HIV/AIDS-related NGOs
in China
External factor: The reduction of international financial
commitment
China resembles some developing countries in that it
has faced the problem of decreasing international HIV/
AIDS financial commitments in supporting its national
HIV/AIDS responses [60]. Given the 2008 Global Finan-
cial Crisis and the continuous economic boom in China,
international and bilateral funding agencies argue that
China should be the donor instead of the recipient of
international HIV/AIDS-specific grants and loans [52].
In the course of interview, respondents in Ford Founda-
tion, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), and Clinton
Foundation in China mentioned that the INGOs re-
duced the financial support on HIV/AIDS programs or
even withdrew from China, whereas UK Department of
International Development (DFID), Oxfam, and Bill &
Melinda Gates Foundation, have retreated from China
since 2013 (INGO-1). The financial support for HIV/
AIDS-related NGOs in China is further shrunk because
of the retreat of the Global Fund in 2014. A HIV/AIDS
specialist working in an INGO and a program manager
of a national NGO recalled the profound impact of the
retreat of Global Fund on HIV/AIDS-related NGOs:
The Global Fund stopped the phase two of the
consolidated program suddenly (With a total of
approximately 500 million, only half of the amount
was implemented in China in the end). As a result, the
number of NGOs working on HIV/AIDS decreased
drastically from 1,000 to 500 between 2013 and 2014
(INGO-1).
Owing to a lack of international and national HIV/
AIDS funding, the number of NGOs working on HIV/
AIDS was drastically reduced; many NGOs and CBOs
were simply closed down, only a few of them could
barely survive with the support by other funding
sources (national NGO-2).
The retreat of the Global Fund has subsequently cre-
ated a policy vacuum for the Chinese government in tak-
ing the lead in managing the development of HIV/
AIDS-related NGOs in China. Mimicking the funding
mechanism of the Global Fund, the State Council
launched the China AIDS Fund for Non-Governmental
Organizations (CAFNGO) (shehui zuzhi canyu aizibing
fangzhi jijin), providing financial resources for HIV/
AIDS-related NGOs via the submission of grant pro-
posal starting from 2017 [61]. The reduction of the
Chinese government’s reliance on the Global Fund im-
plies that the HIV/AIDS-related responses delivered by
the national government are no longer checked by the
external mechanism. The authoritarian regime is prob-
ably the only agency defining/restricting the political
space that NGOs could work in. Explaining the inter-
action between the Chinese authorities and NGOs, a
university professor in Beijing suggested: “In normal cir-
cumstances, local CDC staff hand over treatment deliv-
ery work to grassroots NGOs. Nonetheless, CDC
officials intend to keep these NGOs small, giving them
just enough money to run the programs, so that they
will not grow too strong to pose potential threats to the
government” (academic-1). Along with the weakening of
international securitization efforts and the rise of Chin-
ese government’s involvement in managing NGOs in the
post-Global Fund era, the continuous proliferation of
NGOs is further complicated by the fragmented nature
of HIV/AIDS-focused civil society groups in China.
Internal factor: Fragmented HIV/AIDS-focused NGO
community in China
It is argued that the existing NGO registration system, as
previously mentioned, has brought about a fragmented
NGO community in China. Apparently, government-
organized non-government organization (GONGO) and
registered NGOs working on HIV/AIDS are included in
HIV/AIDS national policy implementation processes,
whereas excluding unregistered grassroots NGOs that are
perceived as illegal or “anti-government” organizations.
Based on the nature of services that individual HIV/
AIDS-focused NGOs provided, service providers are pre-
ferred by the state, whereas NGOs serving as advocates of
human rights and agencies providing legal services for
Lo Globalization and Health  (2018) 14:50 Page 10 of 14
HIV/AIDS-infected people would be subjected to pros-
ecution and coercion. A HIV/AIDS specialist working in
an international NGO in Beijing stated, “During a 2011
HIV/AIDS NGO meeting, the Chinese government clearly
claimed that the authorities would like to work with
NGOs/CBOs conducting service delivery, but not with
those working on HIV/AIDS-related human rights or gen-
der issues” (INGO-1). To further illustrate this point, the
Chinese political leaders publicly praised a Guangxi-based
NGO named AIDS Care China, recognizing the work the
organization had been done in HIV/AIDS prevention,
meanwhile stifling numbers of HIV/AIDS activists
through imprisonment, house arrest, or assault. Dr. Wang
Yanhai and Dr. Gao Yaojie were two of the prominent
Chinese HIV/AIDS activists that fled to the United States
in 2009 and 2010, respectively, due to the recurrent pres-
sure and disturbance exerted by Chinese authorities owing
to their advocacy work. In June 2015, a HIV/AIDS-related
legal aid NGO, Beijing Yirenping, was raided, and two of
its activists were detained. In this regard, the continu-
ous inclusion/exclusion selection process would
weaken unregistered or advocacy groups that con-
ceived as threats to the legitimacy of the authoritarian
regime [62], while preserving NGOs that are willing
to under control by the state apparatus and prepared
to accept the regime’s policy measures. For the sake
of reaching a modus vivendi, these NGOs usually dis-
play self-limiting behaviors, avoiding actions that
would be interpreted as threats to the regime [20],
such as having close relationship or cooperation with
NGOs being “excluded” by the state apparatus.
While a formal local network for HIV/AIDS-related
NGOs or civil society groups has been established in
many countries in Asia, such coordination mechanism
between non-state actors is largely absent in China.13
The fragmentation of HIV/AIDS NGO community is
likewise observed in the course of interview sessions.
Amongst the interviewees, the majority of the NGO re-
spondents believed that cooperation dramatically in-
creased between the government and NGOs working on
HIV/AIDS, especially in the areas of treatment, care,
and prevention. Only a few of them nevertheless stated
that communication and coordination occurred amongst
NGOs in policy implementation. A national-wide NGO
respondent claimed that “We seldom cooperate with
other NGOs or INGOs; we have our own teams to do
the work” (national NGO-3). Some grassroots NGO
respondents in Shanghai and Kunming expressed their
unwillingness to cooperate with so-called “unauthentic”
NGOs or NGOs having so-called “government
background”:
Few NGOs have cooperative relationship. There are
lots of “fake” NGOs in China. The CDC found some
patients to set up grassroots NGOs and then through
the name of such NGO to apply for the Global Fund.
After they received the money, CDC would become the
one who controlled the funding (self-help group-2).
Eighty-five percent of the HIV/AIDS-focused NGOs in
Yunnan have government background…for those
NGOs that are funded by the Global Fund or China-
Bill Gates Projects, these are organizations with the
government background…or if you read their introduction
saying “with the help and support of government”, you
will know these are NGOs with the government
background (self-help group-3).
A “we-they” distinction has apparently prevailed
amongst the HIV/AIDS NGOs community in China, re-
inforcing the atomization of HIV/AIDS-focused NGOs,
discouraging the proliferation of civil society in China.
Horizontal relationship amongst NGOs working on
HIV/AIDS is relatively weak and ill-organized, thereby
avoiding these organizations joining hand to call for fa-
vorable political environment or monetary supports to
continue their operation in China. Owing to the reduc-
tion of international financial commitments, as well as
the fragmentation of HIV/AIDS-focused NGO commu-
nity in China, the proliferation of HIV/AIDS-focused
NGOs in China generated by the international
securitization efforts is nevertheless largely limited in
long run. Such restriction on the concerted efforts of
HIV/AIDS-related NGOs will inevitably pose challenges
to China to fulfill the pledge of the 2030 Agenda to end
HIV/AIDS as one of the targets of the Sustainable De-
velopment Goals (SDGs) [63].
Conclusion
HIV/AIDS was officially announced as a security issue
in 2000 by the UNSC Resolution 1308, which claimed
that the pandemic could pose security threats if left un-
checked. The rhetorical security-threat claim resulted in
the burgeoning number of GHIs organized by the inter-
national and bilateral organizations operating at the state
level. This article illustrates the ways in which the UNSC
Resolution 1308 and the Global Fund influencing the
HIV/AIDS governance in China. Rhetorically acknowl-
edged the HIV/AIDS problems and the irreplaceable role
of HIV/AIDS-focused NGOs in combating the disease
by the Chinese government, the monetary and technical
supports by the Global Fund enabled HIV/AIDS-focused
NGOs to participate in the national policymaking
process, facilitating the proliferation and development of
civil society in China.
This success nevertheless does come with concerns
regarding sustainability. This article shows that inter-
national securitization weakened with the rise of Chinese
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commitment on HIV/AIDS interventions. In other
words, HIV/AIDS-related responses delivered by the na-
tional government are no longer checked by the global
mechanism of HIV/AIDS; thus it is unclear whether
these NGOs would remain of interest as partners for the
government [64]. The fragmentation of the HIV/AIDS
community would further hinder the development, pre-
venting from NGOs with the same interest forming
alliances to call for changes in current political environ-
ment. Such restriction on the concerted efforts of HIV/
AIDS-related NGOs in China would make achievement
of the SDGs to foster stronger partnerships between the
government and civil society (goal 17) difficult, which in
turn hindering the realization of ending HIV/AIDS in
the world by 2030 (goal 3).
This research has several limitations. Firstly, there is a
lack of available information regarding the operation of
local or grassroots HIV/AIDS-specific NGOs that are in
particular helping MARPs in China, owing to the polit-
ical sensitivity of HIV/AIDS, the unregistered status of
NGOs working on HIV/AIDS, the increasing restrictive
environment for NGOs operating in China especially
under the Xi administration, together with the social
stigma attached to their service objects as well as the
NGOs themselves as the service providers. Secondly, it
is difficult to conduct longitudinal study on the develop-
ment of HIV/AIDS-specific NGOs in China. The re-
searcher realized that many of the NGOs that had been
interviewed in 2011 were no longer under operation in
the follow-up fieldwork in 2017, either because these
NGOs could not secure sustainable funding, or they
were cracked down by local authorities for advocating
HIV/AIDS-related human rights or gender equality, or
having very close links to foreign (western) organiza-
tions. Further research therefore needs to be conducted
to remedy these technical weaknesses. It is suggested
that comparative research could be conducted on the ef-
fects (if any) of the regime types, such as China and
Thailand, and the level of socio-economic development
of the country, such as China and Singapore, on the ef-
fects of international HIV/AIDS securitization in the na-
tional levels.
Endnotes
1Here NGOs does not include government-organized
non-governmental organizations (GONGOs).
2Referent objects refer to “things that are seen to be
existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim
to survival.” See Buzan B et al., Security: A New Frame-
work for Analysis, p. 36.
3“Civil society” is often translated as “Minjian shehui”,
“Shiming Shehui” and “Gongming Shehui” in Chinese. In
fact, the three different Chinese terms do not have the
same meaning. Many scholars actually use these differ-
ent Chinese terms of civil society simultaneously. “Min-
jian shehui” is used in this article because the term is
widely used in the academic research in China’s modern
civil organizations. “Civil society” in this article refers to
a sphere that is conceptually separable from the state
and government.
4At the same time the State Council abolished the Jijin
guanli banfa stipulated in 1988.
5The Chinese and English versions of the revised regu-
lation (2016) can be found in Chinalawinfo. “Regulation
on Registration and Administration of Social Organiza-
tions (2016) (Shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli).
6Nevertheless, grassroots NGOs registered under the
MOIC also encounter problems with regard to the
amount and source of funding. As registered commercial
entities, grassroots NGOs are required to pay a 5 % tax
on any revenue, even for funding received for non-profit
purposes.
7In recent years, the abovementioned legislative hurdle
in NGO registration has been relaxed in some parts of
China, first in Shenzhen and then in Beijing. The local
government in these two cities relaxed its NGO registra-
tion rule, and allowed NGOs in the fields of business,
charity, welfare, and social services to register directly
with the MOCA. Such a move can also be observed at
the national level. In early 2011, the national govern-
ment started planning to revise the regulations on NGO
registration and management. If the revised version is
passed by the State Council, the individual-organized or
grassroots NGOs can directly register with the MOCA
without seeking a supervisory body prior to the
registration.
8It is noted that the author is fully aware of the argu-
ments put forward by Timothy Hildebrandt, stating Chin-
ese NGOs could be favored or cracked down by the state
apparatus irrespective of registration status. The author is
argued that unregistered NGOs are comparatively easier
to be targeted and cracked down by the government offi-
cials in the name of “unlawful organizations”. For Hildeb-
randt’s argument, see Hildebrandt, T. The Political
Economy of Social Organization Registration in China.
The China Quarterly. 2011;208:970–89.
9GONGOs are composed of three types of organiza-
tions existed in the 1950s and 1960s: (1) private orga-
nizations from the “old China”; (2) friendship
associations for the promotion of trade, and cultural
exchange agencies; and (3) people’s organizations and
mass organizations.
10In the course of the meeting, US Vice President Al
Gore claimed that HIV/AIDS was a security threat be-
cause “It threatens not just individual citizens, but the
very institutions that define and defend the character of
a society. The disease weakens workforces and saps
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economic strength. HIV/AIDS strikes at teachers, and
denies education to their students. It strikes at the mili-
tary, and subverts the forces of order and peacekeeping”.
11McInnes and Rushton (2010) argued that the HIV/
AIDS securitization in 2000 was not a successful or
complete securitization. However, this article does not
intend to examine whether the international HIV/AIDS
securitization has been fully accepted by the target audi-
ence. It intends to examine the influences of the HIV/
AIDS international securitization on the national and
sub-national levels in China.
12In 2003, the Bush Administration launched the Pres-
ident’s Plan for Emergency AIDS Relief (PEPFAR),
pledging US$15 billion from 2003 to 2008 to “turn the
tide against HIV/AIDS.” The WHO launched the “3 × 5”
campaign that targets getting 3 million people on anti-
retroviral treatment by 2005, while the Multi-Country
HIV/AIDS Program of the World Bank provided more
than US$1.3 billion for grants and concessional loans to
help governments respond to HIV/AIDS issues.
13Examples included the Indian Network of People
Living with HIV/AIDS, Thai Network of People Living
with HIV/AIDS, Asia Pacific Council of AIDS Service
Organization in Malaysia, and also Action for AIDS
Singapore,
Acknowledgements
This work is supported by a Hong Kong University Research Council General
Research Fund grant #144913. The author would like to thank 2 anonymous
reviewers for their useful suggestions. The author would also like to express
the appreciation to Dr. Nicholas Thomas for his comments on an earlier
version of the manuscript. All errors and omissions are the author’s
responsibility alone.
Funding
This work was supported by a Hong Kong University Research Council General
Research Fund grant #144913.
Availability of data and materials
An earlier version of this article was presented at The Political Studies
Association 64th Annual International Conference, April 14–16, 2014, and
The Fifth Young Scholars Conference on Contemporary China in the Oxford
University, May 23–24, 2016. Source data can be obtained from the
corresponding author.
Authors’ contributions
The author read and approved the final manuscript.
Ethics approval and consent to participate
Ethical approval for this research (including subject participation) was provided
by the City University of Hong Kong Human Subjects Ethics Committee, under
the project Asian Diseases in International Affairs, Ref: 2A-54-201,303 (H00112).
Competing interests
The author declares that she has no competing interests.
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published
maps and institutional affiliations.
Received: 19 April 2017 Accepted: 25 April 2018
References
1. Chow GC. Economic reform and growth in China. Annals of economics and.
Finance. 2004;5:127–52.
2. Dittmer L. Introduction: China’s security perspective. In: Dittmer L, Yu MC,
editors. Editors. Routledge handbook of Chinese security. London:
Routledge; 2015. p. 1–17.
3. Jakovljevic MB. BRIC’s growing share of Global Health spending and their
diverging pathways. Front Public Health. 2015;3:135.
4. Yip W, Mahal A. The health Care Systems of China and India: performance
and future challenges. Health Aff. 2008;27:921–32.
5. Jakovljevic M, Potapchik E, Popovich L, Barik D, Getzen T. Evolving health
expenditure landscape of the BRICS nations and projections to 2025. Health
Econ. 2017;26:844–52.
6. Rosenthal E. Rural China, a steep price of poverty: dying of AIDS: New York
Times; 2000. http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/28/world/in-rural-china-a-
steep-price-of-poverty-dying-of-aids.html. Accessed 1 June 2016
7. UNAIDS Data 2017. UNAIDS. 2017. http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/
media_asset/20170720_Data_book_2017_en.pdf. Accessed 8 Apr 2018.
8. Parry J. China’s pragmatic approach to AIDS. Bull World Health Organ. 2006;
84:257–336.
9. CYP L. HIV/AIDS in China and India: governing health security. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan; 2015.
10. Gómez EJ. Geopolitics in health: confronting obesity, AIDS, tuberculosis in
the emerging BRICS economies. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press;
2018. p. 139.
11. Unleash Civil Society in China to Save Lives. Human Rights Watch. 2005.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/07/04/unleash-civil-society-china-save-lives.
Accessed 22 Jan 2017.
12. Gåsemyr HJ. Twenty years of mobilizing around AIDS in China: the main
actors and influences behind organizational growth. Asian Studies Review.
2015;39:609–27.
13. Potter J. Discourse analysis as a way of analyzing naturally-occurring talk. In:
Silverman D, editor. Qualitative research: theory, method and practice.
London: Sage Publications; 1997. p. 146.
14. Silverman D. Interpreting qualitative data: methods for analyzing talk, text
and interaction. London: Sage Pubications; 2001. p. 178.
15. Buzan B, Wæver O, Wilde JD. Security: a new framework for analysis. USA:
Lynne Rienner Publishers; 1998.
16. Wæver O. Security, insecurity and Asecurity in the west European non-war
community. In: Emanuel A, Michael B, editors. Security Communities.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1998. p. 46–86.
17. Howell J. Civil society, corporatism and capitalism in China. Journal of
Comparative Asian Development. 2012;11:271–97.
18. Frolic MB. State-led civil society. In: Timothy B, editor. The civil Society in
China. New York: M. E. Sharpe; 1997. p. 46–67.
19. Saich T. Governance and politics of China. China: Palgrave Macmillan; 2004.
20. Hildebrandt T. Social organizations and the authoritarian state in China.
USA: Cambridge University Press; 2013.
21. Liu, XH. NGOs in China: An Overview. International Community Foundation.
2002. http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_7a9115b80100rox0.html. Accessed 20
May 2017.
22. Hsu C, Teets J. Is China’s new overseas NGO management law sounding the
death knell for civil society? Maybe not. The Asia-Pacific Journal. 2016;14:1–13.
23. Thompson D, Lu XQ. China’s Evolving Civil Society: From Environment to
Health. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. https://www.
wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CEF_Feature.2.pdf. Accessed 8 Apr 2018.
24. Xu Y, Zhao LT. China’s Rapidly Growing Non-Governmental Organizations.
EAI Background Brief No. 514. 2010. http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/publications/
files/BB514.pdf. Accessed 8 Apr 2018.
25. Li H, Kuo NT, Liu H, Korhonen C, Pond E, et al. From spectators to
implementers: civil society organizations involved in AIDS programs in
China. Int J Epidemiol. 2010;39:65–71.
26. Ma QS. Defining Chinese nongovernmental organizations. Volunt Int J
Volunt Nonprofit Org. 2002;13:119–20.
27. China HIV/AIDS Information Network. China Development Brief. 2010. http://
chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/directory/china-hivaids-information-network-
chain/. Accessed 31 Dec 2016.
Lo Globalization and Health  (2018) 14:50 Page 13 of 14
28. Brown GW, Labontè R. Globalization and its methodological discontents:
contextualizing globalization through the study of HIV/AIDS. Glob Health.
2011;7:1–12.
29. Lo CYP, Nicholas T. How is health a security issue? Politics, responses and
issues. Health Policy Plan. 2010;25:447–53.
30. Davies SE. Securitizing infectious disease. Int Aff. 2008;84:295–313.
31. Elbe S. Should HIV/AIDS be securitized? The ethical dilemmas of linking HIV/
AIDS and security. Int Stud Q. 2006;50:119–44.
32. Garrett L. HIV and National Security: where are the links? Council on Foreign
Relations. 2005. https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2005/07/HIV_
National_Security.pdf. Accessed 8 Apr 2018.
33. UN Security Council Resolution 1308 (2000) on the Responsibility of the
Security Council in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security:
HIV/AIDS and International Peace-keeping Operations. United Nation
Security Council. 2000. http://data.unaids.org/pub/BaseDocument/2000/
20000717_un_scresolution_1308_en.pdf. Accessed 14 Jan 2017.
34. Declaration on Commitment of HIV/AIDS. United Nations General Assembly.
2011. http://www.un.org/ga/aids/docs/aress262.pdf. Accessed 10 Jan 2017.
35. Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS. United Nations General Assembly. 2006.
http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2006/20060615_hlm_politicaldeclaration_
ares60262_en.pdf. Accessed 10 Jan 2017.
36. Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS: Intensifying Our Efforts to Eliminate HIV/
AIDS. United Nations General Assembly. 2011. http://www.unodc.org/
documents/southeastasiaandpacific/2012/02/hlm-hiv/20110610_UN_A-RES-
65-277_en.pdf. Accessed 8 10 Apr Jan 20187.
37. Political Declaration on HIV and AIDS: On the Fast Track to Accelerate the
Fight Against HIV and to End the AIDS Epidemic by 2030. United Nations
General Assembly. 2016. http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_
asset/2016-political-declaration-HIV-AIDS_en.pdf. Accessed 20 Jun 2017.
38. McInnes C, Rushton S. HIV, AIDS and security: where are we now? Int Aff.
2010;86:225–45.
39. McInnes C, Rushton S. HIV/AIDS and securitization theory. European Journal
of International Relations. 2013;19:115–38.
40. Global Health Initiatives. World Health Organization. http://www.wpro.who.
int/health_services/global_health_initiatives/en/. Accessed 22 Jan 2017.
41. Global Fund Overview. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and
Malaria. Undated. http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/overview/. Accessed 22
Jan 2017.
42. Kaufman J. China’s evolving AIDS policy: the influence of global norms and
transnational non-governmental organizations. Comparative Politics. 2012;
18:225–38.
43. Interview: China Among Success Stories in Global HIV/AIDS Fight: UNAIDS
Chief. Xinhua. 2015. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-07/15/c_
134415806.htm. Accessed 22 Jan 2017.
44. Anderson D. Peking daily cautions against western threats of AIDS, drugs:
The Associated Press; 1987. LexisNexis Newspapers
45. China Has No Sources, Studies Show: Xinhua; 1988. LeexisNexis Newspapers
46. Ramiah I. Securitizing the AIDS issue in Asia. In: Caballero-Anthony M,
Emmers R, Acharya A, editors. Non-traditional security in Asia: dilemma and
in securitization. England: Ashgate Publishing Limited; 2006. p. 136–67.
47. Speech by Executive Vice Minister of Health, Mr. Gao Qiang, at the HIV/AIDS
High-Level Meeting of the UN General Assembly. Permanent Mission of the
People’s Republic of China to the UN. 2003. http://www.china un.org/eng/
lhghyywj/ldhy/previousga/58/t28511.htm. Accessed 10 Jan 2017.
48. State Council Notice on Strengthening HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control.
NCAIDS, China CDC. 2004. http://www.chinaaids.cn/ddpg/lhpgbg1/zgazbyq/
201312/P020131210547942626797.pdf. Accessed 10 Jan 2017.
49. 国务院关于进一步加强艾滋病防治工作的通知 [State Council Notice on
Further Strengthening HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control.] 国发48号 [State
Council Document No. 48.] (二○一○年) [2010]. http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/
2011-02/16/content_1804536.htm. Accessed 10 Apr 2018.
50. Juan S. Red Ribbon Forum Redoubles AIDS Fighting Bid. China Daily. 2010.
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-07/06/content_10067737.htm.
Accessed 10 Jan 2017.
51. Li R. Li Keqiang Wants Tax Break for NGOs Specializing AIDS/HIV Work.
South China Morning Post. 2012. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/
1093457/li-keqiang-wants-tax-breaks-ngos-specialising-aidshiv-work.
Accessed 20 May 2016.
52. Huang YZ, Jia P. China After the Global Fund. Aidspan. 2014. http://www.
aidspan.org/gfo_article/china-after-global-fund. Accessed 22 Jan 2017.
53. Yu DB, Souteyrand Y, Banda MA, Kaufman J, Perriën JH. Investment in HIV/
AIDS programs: does it help strengthen health Systems in Developing
Countries? Glob Health. 2008;4:1–10.
54. Brugha R, Donoghue M, Starling M, Ndubani P, Ssengooba F, et al. The
Global Fund: managing great expectations. Lancet. 2004;364:95–100.
55. NGO Perspectives on the Global Fund. International Council of AIDS Service
Organizations. 2004. http://www.hivpolicy.org/Library/HPP000321.pdf.
Accessed 10 Jan 2017.
56. China Country Coordinating Mechanism Secretariats. The Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. 2009. https://www.theglobalfund.org/
en/portfolio/country/?loc=CHN&k=c9980a5b-0d86-4ad5-ab99-
788ca847bbb9. Accessed 20 June 2017.
57. 2009/2010 China HIV/AIDS NGO Directory. People’s Republic of China:
National Center for AIDS/STD Control and Prevention; 2009.
58. LaFraniere S. AIDS funds frozen for China in grant dispute. 2011. http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/05/21/world/asia/21china.html?pagewanted=all.
Accessed 10 Jan 2017.
59. Global Fund Lifts China Grant Freeze. The body. 2011. http://www.thebody.
com/content/63640/global-fund-lifts-china-grant-freeze.html. Accessed 10
Jan 2017.
60. Global Report—UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic. UNAIDS.
2013. http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/media_asset/UNAIDS_
Global_Report_2013_en_1.pdf. Accessed 20 Jan 2017.
61. China AIDS Fund For Non-Governmental Organizations. 2016. http://fund.
exieshou.com/news/detail/9/349. Accessed 31 Dec 2016.
62. Bilgin P. Making Turkey’s transformation possible: claiming “security-
speak”—not Desecuritization! Southeast European and Black Sea Studies.
2007;7:555–71.
63. Wang H, Wolock TM, Carter A, Nguyen G, Kyu HH, et al. Estimates of global,
regional, and National Incidence, prevalence, and mortality of HIV, 1980-
2015: the global burden of disease study 2015. Lancet HIV. 2016;3:361–87.
64. Hildebrandt T. The political economy of social organization registration in
China. The China Quarterly. 2011;208:970–89.
Lo Globalization and Health  (2018) 14:50 Page 14 of 14
